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ABSTRACT
Habermas's rules-based deliberative democratic perspective underscores is-
sues of power, legitimacy and justice. The article deploys this perspective to
reveal how the lack of leg itimating procedures and rationa I deliberation at the
World Trade Organ ization (WfOlyietOs power politics and unjust outcomes.
It examines the rule-making process in the successive trade Rounds that led
up to the WTO, as well as the politics of the organisation's rule-application
and consensus-maki ng practices.
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INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has become a highly significant
global body, acting as a permanent forum for liberalisation of trade in
goods and services, and increasingly, for the management of global invest-
ment and intellectual property rights. lt currently boasts a membership of
146 states, with some 30'transition'and developing countries eagerly wait-
ing tojoin. Together, its members engage in some 90 percent of world trade
and investment. But its growing global power, especially in the wake of
the Seattle debacle of 1999, have also engendered growing public scrutiny.
Several analysts and critics (e.9. Bello,2000; Conca,2000; Keohane and
Nye, 2000; Khor, 2000; McMichael, 2000) point out that, despite its out-
wardly democratic ways, it has questionable decision-making procedures
that resu lt in hegemon ic western neoliberalism and/or a 'deficit' 
- 
if not a
'crisis'- of legitimacy and accountability.
In this article, lwill side with these critics, but I will do so from a
Habermasian standpoint. Perhaps more than any other democratic theo-
rist, Habermas provides a way of systematically examining and assessing
liberal democratic institutions. With the goal of extending and radicalising
democracy, his 'deliberative democracy' is a rules-based deliberative pro-
cess that underscores issues of legitimacy and justice. And although not
itself beyond reproach (a point I will elaborate in the article), this delib-
erative process assists in evaluating decision making at the WTO, which
is also rules based. Thus, deliberative democracy helps reveal how inade-
quate legitimating rules and lack of rational deliberation in the WTO yield
power politics, coerced decision making and uryust outcomes.
After outlining Habermas's deliberative democratic vision, I will exam-
ine the rule-making process in the successive trade Rounds that led up
to the WTO. I will then analyse the power politics involved in such rule
making, and how this politics, coupled with the absence of qualitative
deliberation among WTO members, have given way to dubious consen-
sus and decision making, especially from the perspective of developing
countries.
DELI BERATIVE DEMOCRACY
In Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), JUrgen Habermas
argues for a 'public sphere' in which citizens deliberate dialogically. He
distinguishes it from the state and economy, which he characterises as
realms governed by power and money, respectively, and against which
the public sphere must guard. In more recent writings (e.9. 1996a,b), he
develops the specifically discursive elements of the public sphere under
the rubric of 'deliberative democracy'. Here, he argues for politics as a
type of conversation, grounded in legitimating rules and reasoned dia-
logue: 'democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force. .. from the
communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come
into play in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that
secure fair bargaining processes' (1996a: 24).
Habermas encapsulates these fair bargaining processes under what he
calls an 'ideal speech situation' 
- 
a set of formal rules or conditions which
he contends are inherent and anticipated in human communication (1990:
86-7).r These rules ensure free and uncoerced conversation. Thus, an idear
speech situation prevails when it is: (1) inclusive, i.e. no one is excluded
from articulating topics relevantto her,/him, and no relevant information is
left out; (2) coercion free, i.e. participants engage in arguments free of dom-
ination or intimidation;and (3) open and symmetrical, i.e. each participant
can initiate, continue and question the discussion on any relevant topic,
including the very procedures that govern the discussion (1990: 88-9, 197;
1976: 107-9; Benhabib, 1996: 70).
Habermas's proceduralist approach to democratic decision making
means that no limits are imposed on the content or scope of the dialogue:
the discussion agenda is left open, with the recognition that decisions taken
are temporary and may need to be revised when information or circum-
stances change. However, his proceduralism does impose strict limits on
the power relations between interlocutors. He writes, for example, about
the need for a modicum of socioeconomic equality among participants
so they can participate on a relatively equal footing (1993a: 68-9). How-
ever, he is aware that such conditions are difficult to realise in practice.
And he is quick to point out that his ideal speech situation is not empirical
or descriptive; it is a regulative notion, a counterfactual stance from which
to criticise both power politics and those decision-making processes that
arbitrarily constrict or impose political agendas.
As alluded to earlier, of particular concern to Habermas is domination
by the market and the state, which, motivated by material and power
concerns, tend to i m pose financia l,fisca I and ad m i n i strative/technocratic
solutions (1976). For him, corporate and state interests can often coerce
legitimacy and public consensus through domination, manipulation or
commodification of culture. Such depoliticisation, such removal of criti-
cal discourse and limitation of social choices, yield what Habermas calls
'ideology' (1976: 80ft). The ideal speech situation is aimed precisely at min-
imising ideology and maximising decision making by civil society. Not
surprisingly, of late he emphasrzes the need to institutionalise through
legal and constitutional means the formal conditions of the ideal speech
situation so as to both reduce systematically distorted communication and
better regulate, guarantee and expand the public sphere (1996b).
But it is not enough to have legitimating rules; bringing about just
and democratic outcomes or decisions requires rational discourse. Here,
Habermas has in mind, not an autonomous reason that calculates inde-
pendent of society, but a 'communicative rationality' that acts in concert
with others. Deliberative democracy is about a socially generated dialogue
of reason, the to and fro of argument and counter-argument. Consensus is
reached only through the (unforced) 'force of the better argument', that is,
only when every participant accepts explanations and decisions as reason-
able ('1990: 88ff, 160, 198). Thus, consensus is produced through argumen-
tation, not power politics or by the force of an interlocutor's privileged
socioeconomic status. The overall goal is for the community or state to
reflect this consensus in laws and policies.
The quality of consensus-making is imperative in order to arrive atjust or
fair outcomes. ln this regard, Habermas argues against 'mere agreement'
and 'bargaining' in favour of a 'rational consensus' (1990: 67, '198; 1976:
1'11f0. 'Mere agreement' is a consensus reached by aggregating individ-
ual interests or adding up votes. This ballot-box type of decision making
is polarising, producing all-or-nothing outcomes (depending on whether
one belongs to the winning ma.lority or the losing minority) and the rule or
even the tyranny of the majority. 'Bargaining' involves mutual trading of
benefits and costs and often encouraqes the use or acquisition of influence
and power by buying or selling votes. lt means making compromises and,
frequently, catering to the lowest common denominator, thus lowering
the quality of the democratic consensus.2 In contrast, 'rational consensus'
is reached through a 'higher-level intersubjectivity of communication pro-
cesses' ('1996a: 28). In this case, every participant enters the public space
with herlhis individual preferences, and through reasoned debate, arrives
at an expanded view that seeks the good of all. The debate includes the
airing of views, the critiquing of those that are unfounded or unconvinc-
ing, and adjudication between weaker and better claims. The construction
of an enlarged standpoint, for its part, usually involves self-critique, by
bringing in 'universal principles ofjustice into the horizon of the specific
form of life of a particular community' (1996a: 25). Thus, the quality and
justice of the consensus is ensured by rational and critical argumentation
that seeks the generalisability or universalisation of interests.
Before assessing WTO decision making in light of the above, it is impor-
tantto reflecton the extentto which the deliberative democratic perspective
is applicable to the WTO. For, it may be objected, Habermas has in mind
a territorially bound space (i.e. the nation-state) and a historically specific
place (i.e. liberal democracy as ithas developed in theWest) when speaking
about deliberative democracy. Moreover, the WTO is a state-centred and
trade-related institution, which hardly qualifies it as a public sphere dis-
tinctfrom state or economy. Although both objections appearto have merit,
I do not believe them to hold much weight. lt is true that Habermas's early
writing (e.9. 1989, first published in 1962) analyzes the historical rise of
the public sphere in Europe; however, the bulk of his political project since
then has been about the transhistorical and universal human capacity for
communicative rationality. As several analysts have argued (e.9. Bernstein,
1993; Calhoun, 1992: 31-2,40; White, i984: 32), deliberative democracy is
precisely about finding a 'transcendental basis for democracy' (Calhoun,
1992:32). Besides, a publ ic space is not necessari ly place- or space-bound; it
occurs anytime and anywhere political actors cohere and engage in debate
(as indeed states do through their representatives at the WTO). In this con-
nection, Hannah Arendt, another theorist of the public sphere, writes that
the'polis, properly speaking, is notthe city-state in its physical location;
it is the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and speak-
ing together. . . no matter where they happen to be. . . "Wherever you go,
you will be a polis"' (1958: 198). And to wit, the posytransnationalisation
of the public sphere has become a preoccupation of Habermas himself
in his recent writing (cf. i999, 2001), indicative of the importance he at-
taches to extending and radicalising democracy beyond local or national
boundaries.
As [o the second objection, the WTO is neither state nor market; it is a
mu ltilateral forum for negotiation. True, it has a secretariat, butthis is a rela-
tively small bureaucracy that administers decisions issuinq from collective
negotiations. True as well that it deals with economic matters. Butthe WTO
is not itself a market; it is a place to discuss rules aboutthe global market, in
the same way that a nationally based public sphere may debate regulations
governing the national economy. Thus, the WTO eminently qualifies as a
public space, in this case a multilateral sphere. Within it, national represen-
tatives deliberate (i.e. they make, defend and adjudicate claims), primarily
about global economic matters. But although the WTO may be a multilat-
eral (and purportedly a democratic) sphere, to what extent this sphere is
legitimate and rationally deliberative remains to be seen.
MULTI LATERAL TRADE RULE-MAKI NG
Habermas closely ties means to ends, so that, as noted earlier, it is the
process of decision making that gives decisions their 'legitimating force'.
Accordingly, one needs to examine the process (and history) of interna-
tiona I trade ru le making in order to assess the trade ru les. Of course, space
considerations do not allow me to analyze this process in any detail; I shall
investigate merely its broad outlines.
The WTO's claim to being a democratic organisation is based on the fact
that there is sovereign equality (i.e. it has a one-country, one-vote decision-
making system). However, since the late 1950s, virtually all decisions have
been taken by consensus (Steinberg, 2002:344). During most ofthe period
covering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI 1948-1994),
consensus making was common practice; butsincethe creation of the WTO
in 1995, this practice has been formalised. Article lX of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO stipulates that all decisions are to be
taken by consensus, which is to say that unless a member present formally
objects to a proposed measure, it carries. lf and when a consensus cannot
be reached, a decision is taken by a majority vote (of two-thirds or three-
fourths, depending on the nature of the decision) (WTO, 1994). Each WTO
member has the right to attend meetings, make or withdraw proposals
or legal briefs, suggest amendments, and approve or oppose the consen-
sus. Thus, the principle of sovereign equality applies, but within a mainly
consensus-maki ng system.
The WTO includes 23 separate agreements, most of which were negoti-
ated under several GATT Rounds that took place before 1995: the Dillon
Round (1960-1961, devoted mainly to tarifF reductions), the Kennedy
Round (1964-1967, mainly tariffs and anti-dumping), the Tokyo Round
(1973-1979, mainly tariffs and non-tariff barriers) and the Uruguay Round
(1986-1994). The Uruguay Round ended in theestablishmentof theWTO,
but it deviated considerably from the other Rounds by including mea-
sures, not just to further trade liberalisation (through tariff reductions,
particularly in agriculture, textiles and footwear, as well as the contin-
ued elimination of non-tariff barriers), but also to cover new areas such
as investment (under TRIMS, the Trade-Related Investment Measures),
services (under GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services) and
intellectual property (under TRlPs, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights). In 2001, within the ambit now of the WTO, members
reached agreement to begin another 'work program' (which is indistin-
guishable from a Round). The Doha Work Program (2002-2005, some-
times called the Millennium Round) aims at continuing negotiations on
agriculture, anti-dumping and investment, adding a new area (competi-
tion policy), and for the first time, beginning to look at the environmental
dimensions of trade.
Deliberations in each Round happen in various specialised working
groups and drafting committees (small and large), with proposals working
their way through various WTO/GATT council and ministerial meetings.
Of note are the Ministerial Meetings, which are the penultimate decision-
making body and usually happen when there is sufficient momentum on
a number of fronts to warrant a high-level, ministerial meeting, typically
every 2 years (Shrybman,2001:2). Each Round involves three distinct
phases: a launch phase in which members agree to a new Round and its
main agenda items;the negotiation phase, in which the hard deliberations
take place; and the concluding phase in which the final (usually high-level)
talks happen and the agreements are signed.
For the most part, the Round launch phase has been the least contro-
versial, with a reasonably good quality of consensus making (Steinberg,
2002: 350-1). Some exceptions exist, notably at the '1999 Seattle Ministerial
Meeting, which was scuttled in partwhen several developing-country del-
egates were not invited to meetings of direct interest to them (Sampson,
2000: 1101). But generally, consensus has been easier to reach in this phase
because most of the issues members have wanted to be part of the Round
have been accommodated into the agenda. For example, Argentina, Brazil,
Egypt, India and Yugoslavia opposed the launching of the Uruguay Round
until several topics, including liberalisation of trade in tropical products
and textiles, were put on the table (Steinberg, 2002:352). Similarly, in the
lead-up to the Millennium Round, western countries wished to put new
areas on the agenda (labour standards, competition policy, measures to
protect the environment), while developing countries opposed them, ar-
guing instead for the continued implementation of the Uruguay Round
(in such areas as TRlPs, and with the support of the US and Canada, the
continued liberalisation of the EU agricultural sector); a consensus was
reached by including on the agenda most of the topics from both camps.
Deliberations have been much messier in the negotiation and conclud-
ing phases. There is now quite a bit of evidence to suggest that these talks
have happened mainly along North-South lines, with the northern coun-
tries squarely in the driving seat. As Richard Steinberg writes, the'EC and
United States have dominated advancino initiatives at the GATT^A/To for
at least 40 years'(2002: 355; cf. Rugman, 2001:6). The structural reasons
for this trend will be analyzed in the next two sections. For the moment,
it is important to note the ostensible reason: most of the key deliberations
have happened in restricted, 'green room' meetings or caucuses. These
have usually taken place flrst in Brussels and Washington among the so-
called Quad members (the EU, US, Japan and Canada), and then in larger
groups made up of 20-30 western members. More often that not, the draft
outputs from these caucuses have been presented and adopted at the for-
mal WTO/GATT plenary sessions, where they have tended to be accepted
without amendments (Bello, 2000: 86; Khor, 2000: 14-15; Kwa 2002: 15ff;
42-3; Raghavan, 2000: 497; Steinberg, 2002: 355). Gary Sampson notesthat
several developing countries, especially smaller ones, are 'systematically
absent from not only informal, but also formal meetings' (2000: 1100); and
when they are present and make proposals, it is not uncommon for these to
be blocked, ignored or excluded (Khor,2000:'16; Kwa, 2002:13; Steinberg,
2002: 355).
Probably the most vivid illustration of western clout is to be seen in
the actions of the US at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Faced with
developing-country reluctance to accept agreements covering intellectual
property rights, investment and services, the US threatened to withdraw
from the Round and cancel its obligations to any member refusing to sign
the Final Act (Steinberg, 2002:360; see also McMichael, 2000: 469). With
the backing of the EU, it succeeded in presenting a 'single undertaking'
not only to close the Round, but also create a new regime under the WTO.
As Steinberg points out, the US is probably the only country that could
have successfully carried out its threat; it thus chose 'to coerce by exiting
GATT and reconstituting the system [by creating the WTO]' (2002: 357).
In addition to heeding the US threats, the developing countries were con-
vinced to sign on when they were granted tariff reductions on footwear
and textiles by the West (although these have been 'end-loaded', that is,
they are to take effect only in 2005, atthe end ofthe applicable 10-year pe-
riod) and an 11-year transition period (ending in 2006) for implementing
TRIPS.
A notable feature of the Uruguay Round agreements was the creation
of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) under the WTO banner. The DSB's
rulings (exercised by a three-member panel) are legally binding, that is,
national laws that do not conform to WTO agreements or rulings must be
modified, and in thecaseof continued non-compliance, the aggrieved party
is entitled to compensation and retaliatory measures. To date, some 300
disputes have been raised with the DSB, which is many more than during
the nearly 50 years of GATT (Bronckers, 2001 : 45). In fact, the advent of the
DSB is a significant change from GATT. As Dymond and Hart contend,
the'WTO shifted the centre of gravity of international trade rules from
negative prescription to positive ru le-making' (2000:22). In contrast, under
GATI disputes were settled (and in fact avoided) by means of diplomatic
talks between the parties, followed by a consensual agreement among all
members, including the grieving parties.
LEG ITI MATI NG PROCEDURES?
As the previous section implies, and this section will explicate, missing at
the WTO/GATT are meaningful rules/procedures and conditions 
- 
sug-
gested by Habermas's ideal speech situation 
- 
that would legitimate its
democratic decision-making process. There appears to have been a sem-
blance of law-based negotiating in the launch phases of the trade Rounds,
but domination and coercion by the powerful western states for most of
the rest ofthe process (Steinberg, 2002: 354, 365).
The exclusionary dimensions and exclusivity of the western-organised
'green room' caucuses are the most obvious sign of illegitimacy. Markus
Kralewski notes that 'the green room process is clearly an element of a
power-oriented and not of a rules- or principles-oriented system' (2001;
169-70; cf. Khor, 2000: 14-i5). lt may well be unrealistic and impractical
to expect all countries to be represented at all caucus meetings. Moreover,
southern countries do organise their own informal caucuses (Sampson,
2000: 1100). However, it is the repeated and systematic exclusion or ne-
glect of many developing countries in key caucus meetings that is trou-
bling. The main problem is that there are no clear and transparent (and
dialogically generated) rules regulating such caucuses, ensuring for in-
stance that all members are at least invited to them, or if not, spelling out
the criteria for inclusion and exclusion. The absence of such rules means
that the most powerful western members can continue their strong-arm
tactics with impunity.
An important structural issue, putting many developing countries at
a disadvantage, is their lack of resources, capacity and/or expertise for
effective deliberation. Sampson writes that'most small delegations do not
have the appropriate resources either in Geneva or in their capitals to
service the negotiating process and thereby participate meaningfully in
what could be meetings of primary importance for their national interests'
(Sampson, 2000: 1100). Half of all sub-Saharan African countries (15 of a
group of 30 countries) do not even have a delegate resident in Geneva, this
compared to an average of five delegates per mission, and a higher number
for many developed countries (Blackhurst et al., 2000: 498-9). Several of
those developing-country members that do have a Geneva presence report
participating in meetings with few negotiating briefs and little access to
technical or legal analysis (Blackhurst et al., 2000: 494; Chadha et al., 2000:
433; Kwa, 2002:44).
Leading western-country members have made several offers of techni-
cal assistance to disadvantaged WTO members, but little has actually been
forthcoming. The WTO's budget for this purpose is small, amounting to
some $7,000 annually per developing-country member (Blackhurst et al.,
2000: 505ff.; Chadha et al., 2000: 434;Sampson, 2000: '1100). As part of its
post-Seattle efforts to increase public transparency and accountability, the
secretariat has made more documents and analysis available online, in-
cluding its newsletter, WTO Focus (cf. Moore, 2002; WTO, 2000). But to
what extent this move is a blessing or a curse for developing countries
is unclear, since internet access tends to be restricted to higher-income,
urban and mostly developed-country audiences, and those developing-
country delegations without access will no more receive the printed
newsletters upon which they have hitherto been relying (Wilkinson,
2002:132).
Developing countries have themselves tried to strengthen their deliber-
ative positions. By all accounts, Seattle and Doha showed a more active
southern participation than ever before, with southern members authoring
almost half of the submissions for the Ministerial Declaration that ensued
(Chadha et al., 2000: 432). The establishment of the G-22 group of devel-
oping countries at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting, which opposed
the US and EU-led agricultural proposals, is also a positive development.3
But as we havejust seen, overall, there are significant structural inequali-
ties that result in asymmetrical deliberative capacities, to the detriment of
the South. These inequalities explain why many developing countries are
not present or ill-prepared at some meetings (as alluded to earlier); and
why several delegates report being overwhelmed and intimidated during
deliberations (Blackhurst et al., 2000: 494, 499ff.; Kwa,2002:53-4). By the
same token, these inequalities suggest why developed countries tend to
be better informed and placed to negotiate, and why they can (and do)
exclude, ignore or coerce their peers during deliberations.
Just as there is a politics of inclusion and exclusion that goes on within
the WTO'S multilateral sphere, there is one that goes on outside it. Multi-
national corporations (MNCs) have had a significant presence in, so to
speak, the 'shadows' of WTO deliberations. Scholte et al. report that 'ln a
rough ranking, conformers like business associations [as opposed to non-
conformers like many environmental NGOsI have usually had easiest ac-
cess. Thus, for example, 65 percent of the civic organisations accredited
to attend the Singapore Ministerial Conference represented business inter-
ests' (2001: 118). MNCs not only send their representatives to WTO gather-
ings,4 they also lobby national delegations. Thus, Smith and Moran write
that 'More than five hundred corporation and business representatives
were given official credentials as "trade advisors" to the US delegation in
Seattle' (1999: 68; cf. Madeley, 2000: 63; McMichael, 2000: 466; Williams,
2001:45-6, 52). The reason for such a strong presence is that MNCs have
much to gain or lose from WTO negotiations: in 1999, they accounted for
a third of all global exports, with a handful of them virtually controlling
such global sectors as telecommunications, pesticides, commercial seed
and computing (McMichael, 2000: 468; Raghavan, 2000: 497; Shrybman,
2001: 3). They also have much to gain or lose from WTO/DSB rulings, as
illustrated for example by the recent EU-US disputes over bananas and
the foreign sales corporation tax.s
In contrast, NGOs, especially critical ones (as intimated by Scholte et al.
above), have had a more difficult time accessing the WTO. Although sev-
eral have successfully publicised this inaccessibility, they have also en-
countered notable resistance. To wil NGOs are allowed to attend WTO
Ministerial Meetings, and many do 
- 
some 650 were present at Doha, for
example; buttheir access is restricted and controlled. WTO guidelines limit
their attendance to only some meetings and symposia, make only 'infor-
mal arrangements'for receipt of NGO briefs and papers, and allow chairs
of WTO councils or committees to meet with them only 'in their personal
capacity'. The guidelines conclude that, overall, 'it would not be possible
for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings'
(WTO, 1996; cf. Moore, 2002). Of late, the secretariat has agreed to carry
out more briefings, seminars and 'dialogues' with NGOs, but these are
unofficial and take place mostly in Geneva.
The resistanceto a more significant NGO presence appears to be based on
the argument that they are unelected and hence illegitimate. For example,
in an interview with the Financial Times during the Seattle stand-ofl Mike
Moore, the outgoing WTO director-general, asks how NGOs, who 'never
[get] a vote and [don't] actually do anything can come out and attack [the
WTO for being undemocraticl?' (quoted in Smith and Moran, 19991 68).
The problem with this line of thinking is that it exclusivises the nation-
state and territorially-rooted electoral politics as politically legitimate. lt
ignores that many civil society movements and organisations have arisen
out of state exclusion and oppression or the failure of electoral politics to
adequately represent their issues (Esty, 1998; Held, 1995: 267). As a result,
NGOs may be said to have a functional, not electoral or territorial, repre-
sentational importance. They politicise issues (environment, human rights,
small farming, child labour, etc.) that have been systematically neglected
by nation-states or are absent from national agendas at the WTO precisely
because they are extra-national (i.e. global). NGOs can therefore be seen
as an alternative and complementary form of democratic governance and
representation, acting as a counter-balance to state representation in globat
or multilateral spheres (Esty, 1998: 135-37). In the WTO's case, NGOs
can also be seen as acting as a counter-weight to the MNC's significant
influence.
This is not to say that NGO access to the WTO should not be subject to
limitations, for example requiring them to go through accreditation pro-
cedures. However, even with an expanded role, there are many pitfalls 
-
deciding which ones are to be included and excluded and according to
what criteria, correcting for those that get better or worse and more or less
access, etc. For example, as Rorden Wilkinson argues,'theWTO'semerging
regime for dealing with NGOs is likely to continue to favour those well
organised, Northern-based NGOs that can demonstrate a legitimate inter-
est in WTO affairs and which pursue a largely unthreatening agenda 
-
precisely those NGOs that already have access to the WTO' (2002:134; cf .
Barfield, 2001:107; Shaffer, 2001:99). Forthis reason, developing countries
tend to be suspicious of the inclusion of NGOs in the WTO negotiating
process.
This is not to say, as well, that states must not uphold democratic pro-
cesses, and as the WTO itself puts it, bear 'responsibility for taking into
account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear
on trade policy-making' (WTO, 1996; cf. Raustiala, 1996: 7; Shaffer, 2001).
There is a 'legitimacy chain'that moves all the way down from the WTO
national representative to the citizen and local community. The links in
this chain, however, are often broken or inadequate. Depending on is-
sues and delegations, some national representatives and negotiators at
the WTO are liable to be more accountable to balancing diverse national
interests (citizens, communities, NGOs, labour, private sector, scientists,
etc.), while others are not. These representatives are usually appointed
diplomats and bureaucrats, although at times they are elected government
ministers (Krajewski, 2001: 175). After they negotiate and sign WTO agree-
ments, they present them to parliament for consent. However, with the
exception of the more rigorous US congressional review process,o to date
most parliamentary oversight of these agreements has tended to amount
to a rubber-stamping exercise, many parliamentarians investing little time
and discussion (Barfield, 2001: 17ff .; Bellmann and Gerster, 1996). Given
these often weak and arbitrary legitimacy links, therefore, it is difficult
to defend the notion that sovereign states by themselves can or do ade-
quately defend or represent local, national or global interests at the WTO.
As Kra,.lewski writes, 'the longer the ftegitimacy] chain becomes, the more
transparent it has to be. lf the length of the chain is combined with intrans-
parency, it no longer supplies a sufficient degree of democratic legitimacy'
(Krajewski, 200'l : 1 76).
To conclude this section, let me briefly recapitulate the far from 'ideal
speech situation' that reigns at the WTO. Despite an outwardly demo-
cratic process upholding sovereign equality, the organisation lacks le-
gitimating procedures or rules to minimise power inequalities and curb
power politics. In fact, its very privileging of national sovereignty tends
towards exclusion. lts inadequate decision-making procedures end up
providing a marked advantage to the deliberative position and capacity
of some 
- 
the developed countries (especially the most powerful among
them) and MNCs; and a disadvantage to others 
- 
the developing countries
(particularly smaller or weaker ones) and NGOs (particularly non-
conforming and southern ones). The result is a coercive and exclusive delib-
erative sphere, which as the next section will argue, produces questionable
consensus and decisions.
RATIONAL DELIBERATIONS AND JUST OUTCOMES?
The lack of legitimating procedures at the WTO is complemented by a less
than rational decision-making environment, as borne out by the poor qual-
ity of deliberations, on the one hand, and of knowledge, on the other. As
to the first of these, the WTO's multilateral sphere involves less deliber-
ation and more compromises and trade-offs, resulting in what Habermas
calls a 'bargaining'consensus. 'The WTO decision-making process', writes
Krajewski, 'is dominated by bargaining instead of arguing. Negotiators
do not reach solutions and compromises by trying to convince each other
on what is the best solution by rational arguments' (2001: 177; cf. Kwa
2002:x).
Part of the reason that deliberations tend towards bargaining is that,
on the whole, the West has much greater trading and economic lever-
age than the rest of the world. The large internal markets and trading
capacities of the US and EU, in particular, make it possible for them to en-
gage in arm-twisting. For, their economic power (together they account for
about 40 percent of world imports) allows them to absorb costs or potential
threats; while small or weaker countries have much to lose from trade re-
strictions and much to gain from access to US/EU markets (Sampson, 2000:
1100; Steinberg,2002:347-8). Western countries also have at their disposal
such 'carrots' as increased foreign aid or debt reschedul ing to buttress their
bargaining arsenals, which they often use to win over developing coun-
tries (Kwa, 2002:58,66). Indeed, as was outlined earlier, the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, in particular, was characterised by horse-trading,
arm-twisting and 'package deals'. lt is not, then, the 'better' arguments
that triumph in this multilateral sphere, but the economically powerful,
threatening and/or beneficial ones.
As to the quality of knowledge, the reason why Habermas emphasizes
a non-coercive and inclusive public sphere is to maximise the opportu-
nity that all relevant information, and the best arguments, will be aired
and adjudicated. However, the presence of coercion and exclusivity at the
WTO sells knowledge short. The relative depoliticisation of the multilat-
eral sphere means that it is that information and those arguments that most
benefit the western countries and MNCs 
- 
economic and technological in-
formation and arguments 
- 
that tend to prevail. The claim that free trade,
liberalised markets and technology is beneficial to all WTO members may
be convincing, but given thatthe prevailing power relationships are tipped
precisely in favour of those who stand to (and do) benefit most from this
claim, the conviction appears to be little more than what Habermas calls
'ideology' (i.e. the suppression of generalisable social interests through
systematically distorted communication). The prevalence of neoliberalism
at the WTO or elsewhere serves well, for instance, the primarily western
MNCs wanting to enlarge their global markets in such areas as technology,
culture, or health and drugs.
lf economic and technological arguments are mostly in, then social or
environmental ones are mostly out. This exclusion is related in part to the
relative lack of access to the WTO by NGOs, many of which represent
socio-environmenta I i nterests, i ncl ud ing commun ities that are negatively
affected by trade and economic liberalisation or privatisation. They are
critical of not only their restricted access to WTO meetings, but also the
absence of public scrutiny of the DSB. To be sure, the DSB hearings are
carried out in camera, are open only to the grieving parties (not even to
other WTO members), and do not entertain NGO submissions. Moreover,
DSB panellists are mostly trade experts, economists and corporate lawyers,
with little or no knowledge of non-trade issues (Barfield, 2001: 5; Conca,
2000: 485). The NGOs are thus correct in claiming that non-economic and
non-technocratic arguments (such as environmental, labour or consumer
oriented ones) are unlikely to be seriously entertained at the WTO. In
fact, to date, DSB decisions have been pro-trade liberalisation and anti-
environmental almost without exception (Conca, 2000: 486, Esty, 2000).
This in spite of principles and clauses in WTO agreementsT that could be
interpreted as pro-environmental.
The point that economic and technological claims prevail over others is
not meant to convey that the WTO is a monolithic bastion of neoliberalism
and westernisation. lt does, after all, have a multilateral sphere, where dis-
senting views and non-economic and anti-westernisation arguments are
held and sometimes aired by national delegates, even in the absence of
critical NGOs. The point is that power fixes or privileges certain types of
knowledge, and ignores and suppresses others, so that it is the knowledqe
claims of the dominant participants that tend to get naturalised. Thus, fbr
example, several developing countries stand against the inclusion of is-
sues such as the environment and labour on the WTO agenda (Bronckers,
2001:46): they do so not necessarily because they are against environ-
mental or labour rights, but because they suspect that the dominant WTO
knowledge/power regime is likely to use environmental and labour stan-
dards to discriminate against them in precisely those areas in which they
have a comparative advantage (i.e. the fact that they have low environ-
mental and labour costs, which makes their exports cheaper, could be used
against them).
The combination of inadequate leg itimating procedures and lack of qua l-
itative deliberations makes it unlikelv that WTO outcomes will be iust. ln
the midst of power politics, exclusion, bargaining and uncritical knowl-
edge, the consensus reached in this multilateral sphere is most likely to be
coerced and one-sided 
- 
to the advantage of western members. Of course,
this imbalance may not always happen along westernhon-western lines:
there may be occasional losers within the West, for example as a result
of the continuing US-EU dispute over agriculture (although even here,
until the dispute is settled, it is developing-country farmers who end up
bearing most of the brunt, from being shut out of western markets); and
there will be exceptions, such as for instance the decision at Doha by the
US to finally relent on allowing developing-country generic drug pro-
duction in the case of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. Overall, however,
the WTO regime will tend (and has tended) to be advantageous to the
West.
Levelling the playing field in trade and other global economic realms
may well be the function of the WTO, but under conditions of coerced
decision making and (historically and structurally) unequal trading rela-
tionships, levelling the playing field amounts to westernisation. An illus-
tration of this is to be seen in the TRIPs and TRIMs agreements, which read
as though developing countries can pay for and have easy access to tech-
nology and investment, and as though developed countries do not already
dominate the global market in these areas (Bello, 2000: 76). The univer-
sal harmonisation envisaged in TRIPs and TRIMs thus translates into the
rest of the world conforming to western patenVcopyright and investment
regimes. True, developing countries have been granted transition periods
to implement these agreements; but Walden Bello is quick to point out
that 'Although the GATT-WTO Accord does recognize the "special and
differential status" of the developing countries, it does not see this as a
case of structurally determined differences but as one of gaps that can be
surmounted by giving developing countries a longer adjustment period
than the developed countries' (2000: 74).
A last related point: under these unequal conditions, the DSB suffers
multiple legitimacy problems. For, not only does it base itsjudgments on
agreements resu lting from questionable i nternational consensus, but its de-
liberations are closed and its rulings binding. Whereas, as mentioned ear-
lier, GATT rulings on disputes were imposed only with collective consent,
WTO,/DSB rulings have been judicialised; and judicialisation, Diamond
and Hart contend, 'has taken rule-making out of the hands of members
and made it appear distant and unaccountable' (2000: 25; cf .34; Clarkson,
1999; Keohane and Nye, 2000: 33; Krajewski, 2001:171). Now from the
perspective of developing countries, DSB adjudication could be an in-
surance against the unilateralism of the powerful western states. How-
ever, given the power/knowledge inequalities mentioned earlier, this is
not I ikely to be the case. Furthermore, jud icialisation reproduces earlier re-
source inequalities, giving states with good legal resources an advantage
and thus substituting western negotiating power with western legal power
(Barfield, 2001: 7 5: Gabi londo, 2001 ).
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I want to reflect on the significance and relevance of
Habermas's perspective in assessing decision making at the WTO. Delib-
erative democracy is important in helping understand the links between
deliberation and issues of power, legitimacy andjustice, so that when Mike
Moore (or his successor) defends his organisation as democratic and con-
tends that the 'WTO is not imposed on countries... No country is forced
to sign our agreements' (quoted in Kwa, 2002:14), his claims do not stand
up well to scrutiny. For a start, it is improbable that in today's globalised
economy, any country enjoys the choice of staying out of the WTO, no
matter whether it perceives the WTO as democratic or not. Few countries 
-
and certainly no small country 
- 
can risk being isolated from the organisa-
tion's powerful and growing economic and trade ambit. Moreover, when
a country doesjoin, there are not many (legitimating) procedures to min-
imise power politics, exclusion and arm-twisting, with the result that it
may indeed be forced to sign on to WTO agreements. Consequently, it
may well find that the WTO has created the illusion of fair rules (democ-
racy) and outcomes (trade or market liberalisation), from which powerful
(and mainly western) states derive substantial advantage.
Given this bleak assessment of democratic politics at the WTO though,
it seems justified to ask whether my Habermasian position sets too high
a standard. ln other words, is the gap between the ethical norm and the
empirical case too wide? This would be a 'realist'counter-position, based
on the view that international relations are too anarchic and replete with
power to argue for transnational democratic legitimacy. I beg to differ
on two grounds. First, I disagree fundamentally with the realist assump-
tion of being able to take an impartial and descriptive stand on interna-
tional relations, thus keeping at bay issues of legitimacy and morality.
lf the twentieth-century'linguistic turn' in science and social science has
taught us anything, it is that a description is always already a position.
The politico-moral stand implied by realism appears to be the justifica-
tion of 'what is', which translates into the continued use of coercion and
power politics. Habermas's perspective is important because it upholds the
need for an ideal from which to assess and criticise coercion, illegitimacy
and iryustice, whether at the WTO or other national and transnational
institutions. Second, it is not as though deliberative democracy imposes
ex nihilo the question of political legitimacy on the WTO. The WTO has
itself instituted a multilateral sphere which it touts as democratic and con-
sensual. The Habermasian perspective, like that of (at least a few of) the
Seattle demonstrators, is aimed at assessing and criticising the legitimacy
of this sphere, with a view to extending and deepening its democratic
dimensions. As Thomas Risse puts it, there is a 'process of argumenta-
tive "self-entrapment" [in international organisations such as the WTO]
that starts as rhetorical action and strategic adaptation to external pres-
sures' and, with sustained public outcry and scrutiny, may end up 'with
argumentative behaviour resembling the criteria defined [by deliberative
democracyl' (2000: 32).
The types of measures that the WTO would have to take in order to
close the wide gap between its democratic pretensions and practices are
implicit in my above Habermasian critique. There is a dire need for collec-
tively elaborated procedures to m inimise power inequal ities and maxi mise
information/knowledge. Missing, in particular, are: ('l) clear and transpar-
ent rules governing the 'green room' caucuses in order to broaden their
membership, check against coercive negotiating tactics by powerful trad-
ing members, and guarantee a more equal geographic representation (cf.
Schott and Watal, 2000); (2) the provision of significantly greater resources
to small and economically weak developing-country members to help
them improve their deliberative and legal capacities; and (3) the limita-
tion or regulation of MNC involvement in national delegations and WTO
deliberations. There is also a dire need for the WTO to re-consider making
national sovereignty the sole basis of membership and representation. As
we have noted, this policy results in closed-doortrade discussionsand DSB
hearings. Inclusion ol and outreach to, a wide range of civil society organi-
sations will better ensure qualitative deliberations and the incorporation of
non-territorial and transnational issues and interests (e.9. environmental
issues, human rights). In this regard, the WTO can take inspiration from
other multilateral forums such as the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee (ESC), which carries out advisory/policy activities for the European
Commission and parliament. The ESC successfully combines functional
representation (of socio-economic NGOs) with territorial representation
(of sovereign European members) (cf. Smismans, 2000).
But this is not to argue that the Habermasian perspective is without re-
proach: the WTO case does cast some doubt, in particular, on a consensus-
based democratic system. Several critics8 have warned that the risk of
seeking a universal consensus is the suppression of difference (Benhabib,
1996: 7-9,73ff.; Fraser, 1989, 1992; Young, 1996). This eventuality is borne
out atthe WTO, with smaller and weaker members' voices being ignored or
denied by powerful ones. Of course, Habermaswould respond by arguing,
rightly, that difference is only denied because the conditions for a qualita-
tive consensus do not exist atthe WTO. The problem, however, may also be
the very requirement of reaching a single and often once-and-for-all agree-
ment. Habermas's critics have suggested the a lternative of 'subaltern coun-
terpublics' (Fraset 1992:123-4) and 'deliberative enclaves of resistance in
which those who lose in each coercive move can rework their ideas and
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strategies, gathering forces and deciding in a more protected space in what
way or whether to continue the battle' (Mansbridge, 1996: 47). The impli-
cations of this suggestion are left unclear, but presumably it would involve
an agreement to disagree when there are irreconcilable differences, and the
creation of multiple public spaces and multiple consensus. The practicabil-
ity and feasibility of this suggestion may be doubtful, but at the very least
it does point up the problematic power relationships inherent in the very
search for (let alone the making of) a universal consensus at such global
organisations as the WTO.
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NOTES
Note that, of late, Habermas appears to prefer the terms 'norms of discourse'
and 'procedures of discourse' over'ideal speech situation',
More recently, Habermas recognizes that compromises may be necessary in
exceptional circumstances 
- 
specifically conflicts over distributive issues, where
participants are often highly polarised and consensus is almost impossible to
reach (1993b:448).
At the time of writing this article, it is too early to tell whether the formation
and oppositional stance of the G-22 group (led by China, Brazil, India and South
Africa) is a trend or an exception in WTO negotiations. The accession of China
to the WTO may have emboldened and strengthened the negotiating position of
these economically powerful developing countries. However, it is unclear how
unified this group will remain or what the future US and EU reaction to such
opposition will be. The US has already threatened that continued developing-
country opposition may cause it to seek out bilateral and regional, as opposed
to mu lti lateral, agricultural agreements.
MNC lobbying activities at WTO meetings include being able to act as 'host',
For example, Microsoft and Boeing co-chaired the'Seattle Host Committee'at
a cost of half a million dollars (Times of India, 1999).
The US-EU banana dispute is an overt case of opening the EU market to US
fruit MNCs (i.e. the Latin American-based US companies, Chiquita 
- 
formerly
the United Fruit Company 
- 
and Dole) atthe expense of smaller Caribbean pro-
ducers (Rugman, 2001 : 9-10). The WTO ruled that the EU was discriminating
against these MNCs (because the EU was honoring its Lome Convention obli-
gations favouring imports from its ex-Caribbean colonies). The US-EU 'foreign
sales corporation tax'dispute concerns the US government exempting from in-
come taxes the offshore subsidiaries of US corporations such as Boeing, General
Motors, Eastman Kodak, Microsoft and Caterpillar, which are located in tax
havens and carry out export transactions on behalf of their parent companies
(Rugman, 2001: 12-13). !n2002, the WTO found in favour of the EU.
Of late, this review process seems to be eroding: in late 2002, the US Congress
gave George W. Bush fast-track 'trade promotion authority' to negotiate trade
agreements, that Congress will vote on (on a 'yes' or'no' basis), but will no more
have the ootion of amendinq.
For example, the preamble of the WTO agreements callfor'expanding the pro-
duction of and trade in goods and services, while allowing forthe optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objectives of sustainable develop-
ment' (WTO, 1999). Moreover, as often repeated by environmentalists, Article
XX of GATT mentions a number of exceptionsto the principle of trade liberalisa-
tion, including that'nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures. . . (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health... (g) relating to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption' (WTO,
1999). Thus, Beukel contends that 'the basic principle of the WTO trade regime
today is more heterogeneous and contentious than the notion "open markets
and liberalised trade is good for globalwelfare," and hence, more vulnerable to
divergent interpretations and country positions' (2001: 141; cf. Bronckers, 2001:
53; Shrybman, 2001:'16, Williams, 2001).
Note that these are all 'friendlv'critics, that is, Habermasian revisionists.
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